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COMMENTS
EQUITABLE REDUCTION UNDER THE
DEFECTIVE PRICING STATUTE:
PUBLIC LAW 87-653
INTRODUCTION
Each year the Department of Defense spends more tax money
than any other agency of the United States Government.1 Since a
great amount of this money is expended in the form of contracts
with private industry for the procurement of weapons systems and
other materials considered vital to national defense, both Congress
and the Department of Defense are greatly concerned that the
Government pay no more than a "fair and reasonable price" for
any procurement.' To insure the Government a fair and reasonable
price in its dealings with the defense industry and to safeguard
against realization of excessive profits by defense contractors, Con-
gress enacted amendments to the Armed Services Procurement
Act of 1947.8 In addition, through the Armed Services Procurement
Regulations (ASPR) the Defense Department has prescribed a
formidable and extensive system of procedures for negotiated pro-
curements by the Armed Services.' These regulations also require
that some defense contracts contain various provisions calling for
an adjustment of the contract price upon the occurrence of specified
contingencies.'
In recent years, there has been increasing concern that the
1 U.S. Bureau of the Census, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 252
(88th ed. 1967). In 1966 the Defense Budget totaled $57,718,000,000. Expenditures
equaled $55,686,000,000 and of that amount $38,243,000,000 was spent for military
procurements. Id. at 254-55. During Fiscal Year 1965, the Defense Department entered
into some thirteen million contracts. Note, Equitable Adjustment of Government Con-
tracts, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 302 n.1 (1967).
2 Cf. Petit, The Defective Pricing Law and Implementing Regulations-A Year
and a Half Later, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 552, 553 (1964). Of particular concern
are contracts involving non-competitive procurement in which the force of competition
in the open market is absent, and therefore the possibility that the contractor will
receive an excessive profit is correspondingly greater.
3 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-13.
4 See, 32 C.F.R. §§ 3.100-3.904 (1967). The ASPR also prescribe procedures and
requirements for contracts procured by competition, formal advertising, and other
special methods. See generally 32 C.F.R. §§ 1-30.7 (1967).
5 See, e.g., clause for "Changed Conditions," 32 C.F.R. 7.601-4 (1967) (Construc-
tion Contracts) ; "Price Adjustment for Suspension Delays or Interruption of Work,"
32 C.F.R. § 7.602-46 (1967) (Fixed-Price Construction Contracts) ; "Government Prop-
erty Clause for Fixed-Price Contracts," 32 C.F.R. § 13.702(b) (1967) (Use of Govern-
ment property by the contractor in performance of the contract).
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Department of Defense has been paying contractors higher prices
than it would have if the contractors had furnished accurate, com-
plete and timely cost and pricing data that were available to the
contractor.6 In 1959, the General Accounting Office submitted
a report to Congress documenting numerous instances of over-
charging due to the failure of the contractor to disclose current,
accurate and available data.7 As a result, the Defense Department
extensively revised the ASPR pertaining to negotiated procure-
ments,8 and added a provision requiring a contractor to execute a
Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data certifying that to the
best of the contractor's knowledge and belief the data submitted to
the Government in support of a bid were complete, current, and ac-
curate.' Subsequently, in 1961, the Defense Department again re-
vised the ASPR relating to contract negotiations, and required that
negotiated, fixed price type contracts in excess of $100,000 contain a
Price Reduction for Defective Pricing Data clause. 10 The clause in
part provided that:
A. If the Contracting Officer determines that any price negotiated in
connection with this contract was overstated because the Contractor,
or any first-tier subcontractor covered by (C) below, either (i) failed
to disclose any significant and reasonably available cost or pricing data,
or (ii) furnished any significant and reasonably available cost or pric-
ing data which he knew or reasonably should have known was false or
misleading, then such price shall be equitably reduced and the contract
shall be modified in writing accordingly."
One year later, Congress enacted Public Law 87-653,12 often
6 See generally American Bosch Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA
[ 5230, at 24,846 (1965).
7 Id. Overcharges appeared to occur most frequently in the aircraft and missile
industries and under fixed-price incentive contracts. Fixed-price incentive contracts are
those in which there is a fixed target cost (or successive target costs), or price ceiling,
and a provision for the adjustment of profit and establishment of the final price by
the use of a formula which reflects the risk assumed by the contractor, difficulty of the
contract effort, the investment of the contractor and other factors. 32 C.F.R. § 3.404-4(1967). For a general discussion of incentive contracting see Nash, Incentive Con-
tracting, 22 FED. B.J. 195 (1962).
8 Id.
9 See 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-3 (1959). For the present prescribed form of the certificate
see 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-4 (1967).
Under the earlier regulations the contractor was required to certify as to estimated
costs as well as pricing data. The certificate was required when the amount of the
procurement exceeded $100,000 and was based more on the contractor's cost than
competitive or regulated prices.
10 American Bosch Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA f 5280 at 24,848(1965). This revision was the result of recommendations made by the Armed Services
Committee of both houses. It is interesting to note that at the time of the revision to
the ASPR, legislation requiring reduction in price for incomplete, inaccurate or defective
data had been introduced in the House and had passed, but had not been acted upon
by the Senate. 106 CONG. REC. 14255-58 (1960).
11 See 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-7 (1961) (emphasis added).
12 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304, 2306, 2311.
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referred to as the "Truth in Negotiations Act" or the "Defective
Pricing Statute." 3 Although the statute speaks to more than just
price reduction for the submission of inaccurate data,' 4 it has had
its greatest impact in the area of price reduction.' As applied to
cost and pricing data, P.L. 87-653 provides that in certain negotiated
contracts' 6 the contractor must execute a certificate of pricing data
as to the accuracy, completeness and currency of the data and pro-
vides for downward adjustments of the contract price when the
Government discovers that the price has been significantly increased
as a result of submitting inaccurate, incomplete, or non-current cost
or pricing data.'
In implementing the price adjustment provisions of the statute,
the ASPR were again revised to include the present form of the
Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data 8 and the Price Reduc-
13 See, e.g., Spartan Corp. ASBCA No. 11363, 68-1 BCA II 6730, at 31,168 (1967)
(Rehearing); Cutler-Hammer Inc., ASBCA No. 10900, 67-2 BCA [ 6432, at 29,826
(1967); Defense Electronics, Inc., ASBCA No. 11127, 66-1 BCA 5604, at 26,203
(1966) ("defective pricing data statute"). One writer has called it the "defective pricing
law," Petit, The Defective Pricing Law and Implementing Regulations-A Year and a
Half Later, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 552 (1964). Others term it the "Truth in
Negotiations" statute, Spector, Equitable Adjustments Under Government Contracts-
What They Are, When They May Be Claimed, How They May Be Proved, PuB.
CONTRACT NEWSLTR. Dec. 1967 at 4. Still others have referred to the price reduction
provisions as the "Truth-in-Negotiating Certificate." McClelland, Negotiated Procure-
ment and the Rule of Law: The Fiasco of Public Law 87-653, 32 FORDHAm L. REV.
411, 439 (1964).
14 P.L. 87-653 also revised the law as to the types of contracts that may be used,
and gave the head of an agency greater latitude in the kind of contract executed. 10
U.S.C. § 2306. For a discussion of the impact of the law on the policy of utilizing
competitive procurement whenever possible, see MeClelland, supra note 13.
15 Cf. Petit, supra note 2 at 552: "The issuance of these new regulations [imple-
menting P.L. 87-653) immediately touched off a storm of criticism in the government
contracting community.... At the time of this writing, a year and a half later, only a
few of the basic problems have been resolved-and the storm rages on."
16 The Act affects only negotiated contracts in excess of $100,000. It does not
apply in cases where the contract price can be determined on the basis of adequate
competition, market prices, or in cases where prices are fixed by law. It should be
noted that the Act is not limited in its operation to Defense Department contracts;
however, it is in this area that its greatest impact is felt.
17 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) provides in part that: "A prime contractor or any subcon-
tractor shall be required to submit cost or pricing data . . . and shall be required to
certify that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the cost or pricing data he sub-
mitted was accurate, complete, and current ...
"Any prime contract or change or modification thereto under which such certifi-
cate is required shall contain a provision that the price to the Government, including
profit and fee, shall be adjusted to exclude any significant sums by which it may be
determined by the head of the agency that such price was increased because the con-
tractor or any subcontractor required to furnish such certificate, furnished cost or
pricing data which, as of the date agreed upon by the parties (which date shall be as
close to the negotiated price as is practicable), was inaccurate, incomplete, or non-
current. . . ." (emphasis added).
18 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-4 (1967).
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tion for Defective Pricing Data clause 9 (hereinafter referred to as
the Price Reduction clause). The present Price Reduction clause
provides in part that:
(a) If the Contracting Officer determines that any price, including
profit or fee, negotiated in connection with this contract was increased
by any significant sums because the Contractor or any subcontractor in
connection with a subcontract covered by (c) below, furnished incom-
plete or inaccurate cost or pricing data or data not current as certified
in the Contractor's Cerificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data, then
such price shall be reduced accordingly, and the contract shall be
modified in writing to reflect such adjustment.20
In form, the present clause differs significantly from the pre-legisla-
tive clause. The new clause eliminates the requirements of "any
significant and reasonably available cost or pricing data" and
"equitable reduction." Rather, it provides for a price reduction if
the contract price is merely increased by any "significant amount"
because of the submission of defective data. In addition, there is
now an explicit relationship between the Certificate of Current Cost
or Pricing Data and the Price Reduction clause, and there may be
a reduction if the significant increase in price is the result of data
not current as certified in the Contractor's Certificate. Finally, under
the present clause any reduction apparently need not be "equitable."
Although the contract price adjustments for the utilization of
defective pricing data were not unknown prior to the statute, the
Act has raised questions as to the definition of "significant increase"
and "data," what form the adjustments will take, and whether the
law may work an unwarranted hardship on the contractor. It is the
purpose of this comment to examine the application of the Defective
Pricing Statute by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
(ASBCA) 21 and to determine whether the statute significantly alters
19 32 C.F.R. § 7.104-29 (1967). The Price Reduction for Defective Data clause
has also been referred to as the "Defective Data clause."
20 Id. (emphasis added).
21 The ASBCA is the administrative body which hears appeals from the decisions
of the Contracting Officer, and is composed of civilian and military attorneys selected
by the Defense Department. The Board has jurisdiction to interpret contract provisions
and to resolve disputes arising under the contract, including adjustments of the contract
price. However, the Board cannot determine whether the contract has been breached
or award money damages, which are for the courts to decide. For a general discussion
of the Appeals Board and its role in settling contract disputes, see Shedd, Disputes and
Appeals: The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
39 (1964).
ASBCA decisions may be appealed to the Court of Claims but the court is gen-
erally limited in its review to the record of the administrative proceeding. United
States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966); United States v.
Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 708 (1963). See also Cuneo and Anthony, Beyond
Bianchi: The Impact of Utah and Grace and Judicial Review of Contract Appeals
Boards' Decisions, 55 GEO. L.J. 602 (1967).
1968]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
the practice of price adjustments prior to P.L. 87-653, and if so,
whether it results in an undue hardship on the contractor.
PRICE REDUCTIONS PRIOR To P.L. 87-653
Equitable Adjustment
"Equitable adjustment" is a phrase found in numerous clauses
of fixed price type contracts and the fee aspect of cost-plus-fixed-fee
contracts.22 Its application generally results in a modification of
the contract price, although it may also modify the time for per-
formance.23 It is apparently unavailable if not specifically provided
for in the contract, but when present, the process of equitable adjust-
ment permits the contractual relationship to continue where other-
wise there might have been a breach. 4 An equitable adjustment
may be utilized only in case an act or change is not inconsistent
with the existence of the contract.2 5 Although the point at which
a modification to the contract ceases to be sufficiently within the
scope of the contract to permit equitable reduction is not clear,26
the distinction between breach and equitable adjustment is ex-
tremely important. Equitable adjustment may result in compen-
sation and an extension in time for performance, while the only
remedy for breach of contract is money damages.2 In addition, the
procedure for resolving disputes differs in each case: equitable ad-
justments are resolved more rapidly28 by an administrative proce-
dure subject to court review, while a breach of contract action
must be litigated in the appropriate federal court.29
.The equitable adjustment approach to government contract
administration promotes flexibility throughout the performance of
the contract, aids in avoiding work stoppages due to negotiation
over changes and provides an expeditious method of settling dis-
putes.80
22 See Spector, Confusion in the Concept of Equitable Adjustment in Government
Contracts, 22 FED. B.J. 5, 6 (1962). The cost-plus-fixed-fee contract is one kind
of incentive provision, and although the fee, or profit negotiated does not vary with
actual cost, it may be adjusted as a result of subsequent changes in the contract.
32 C.F.R. § 3.406-5 (1967). See also Nash, supra note 7.
23 Id. at 5.
24 Note, Equitable Adjustment of Government Contracts, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 302,
304 (1967).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 306. See also Spector, supra note 22 at 9.
28 Id. at 319. "The average time between the docketing of an appeal and the
rendering of a decision by a board in those cases where a hearing is held is approxi-
mately fourteen months; this contrasts with a delay of two and one-half years on
motions in the Court of Claims and five and one-half years on disposition by trial."
29 Id. at 305.
30 Id.
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Although there is little disagreement as to the value of
equitable adjustments, there is considerable controversy and con-
fusion as to the proper method of calculating the amount of the
adjustment. 1 To determine the amount of the adjustment, the
difference between the cost of the modified performance and the
cost of performance originally contemplated by the parties is cal-
culated. This calculation necessarily involves the determination of
two cost figures: original performance and modified performance. 2
The appeals boards have utilized two methods of calculating these
figures: the "objective" method which is based upon the reasonable
value (or cost) of the work involved,3 and the "subjective" method
which is based upon the contractor's actual costs of performing the
work involved.34
It has been argued that since there are two methods of calcu-
lating each cost figure, there are four ways to determine the amount
of the equitable adjustments, at least where the determination is
retroactive:
(1) (actual cost of changed work)-(bid price of original
work);
(2) (actual cost of changed work)-(reasonable cost of original
work);
(3) (reasonable cost of changed work)-(reasonable cost of
original work);
(4) (reasonable cost of changed work)-(bid price of original
work) .
Inconsistent application of the various methods of calculating
the equitable adjustment has characterized the decisions of the
31 Compare Spector, Confusion in the Concept of the Equitable Adjustment in
Government Contracts, 22 FED. B.J. 5 (1962) with McBride, Confusion in the Concept
of the Equitable Adjustment in Government Contracts: A Reply, 22 FED. B.J. 235
(1962), and Note, Equitable Adjustment of Government Contracts, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv.
302, 320-30 (1967).
32 Note, Equitable Adjustment of Government Contracts, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv.
at 320.
33 Spector, supra note 22 at 6 n.3: "In speaking of an objective, or reasonable cost
approach, there is meant the reasonable cost to a typical contractor similarly situated.
The 'similarly situated' element thus blending into the definition some of the sub-
jective characteristics of the particular contractor involved."
34 Id. at 6.
35 Note, Equitable Adjustment of Government Contracts, 42 N.V.U.L. REV. at
321. Where the adjustment occurs prior to completion of performance and therefore
is prospective, the only disputed item will be the cost of the original work. Conse-
quently, only two methods of computation are available. The author indicates that
there is a third method, the "modified subjective approach" which is merely a formula
to be utilized in determining whether to apply the subjective or objective method in a
particular situation.
1968]
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contract appeals boards, and it has been suggested that no single
method of calculation should be applied to all situations. Rather,
the cases should be categorized and the correspondingly appropriate
method of computation applied."
Elements for Reduction
Although most equitable adjustments are resolved by con-
tracting officers without the need for a detailed explanation of how
the result was reached'17 the Armed Services Board of Contract Ap-
peals (ASBCA) has adjudicated disputed adjustments and set forth
the requirements entitling the Government to a price reduction. In
decisions involving reductions under the pre-statute Price Reduction
for Defective Pricing Data clause, the ASBCA generally required
that the Government prove: (1) that the contractor failed to dis-
close significant and reasonably available cost or pricing data re-
lating to a specific cost item, and (2) that the failure to disclose
resulted in an overstatement of price.3" Whether these elements
were satisfied by the Government in a given case often involved a
determination of what constituted "pricing data," what was meant
by "significant data," and defining the limits of "reasonably avail-
able," and "disclosure."
What constituted cost or pricing data for the defective pricing
clause was a particularly troublesome problem for the ASBCA in
the pre-statute decisions.39 Prior to the regulations implementing
the Defective Pricing Statute, the Board apparently had no official
guidelines to use in determining whether an item was cost or pricing
data." There is an indication in some cases that for the purposes
of a price reduction under the defective pricing data clause, there
was no clear distinction between data that were factual in nature,
and therefore verifiable, and estimates of future costs based upon the
contractor's judgment.4 The Board remedied this situation in 1966
by applying to pre-statutory cases the definition of cost or pricing
36 Id. at 330.
37 Spector, Equitable Adjustments Under Government Contracts-What They Are,
When They May Be Claimed, How They May Be Proved, PUB. CONTRACT NEWSLTR.
Dec. 1967 at 3.
38 See, e.g., Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Lockheed Ga. Co. Div., ASBCA No. 10453,
67-1 BCA ff 6356, at 29,446 (1967); FMC Corp., ASBCA Nos. 10095 & 11113, 66-1
BCA fT 5483, at 25,699 (1966); American Bosch Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2
BCA ff 5280, at 24,849 (1965).
30 See Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Lockheed Ga. Co. Div., ASBCA No. 10453,
67-1 BCA II 6356, at 29,450 (1967); FMC Corp., ASBCA Nos. 10095 & 11113, 66-1
BCA ff 5483, at 25,700 (1966).
40 Cases cited note 38 supra.
41 Cf. American Bosch Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA I 5280, at
24,847, 849 (1965).
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data found in the post-statutory ASPR regulations.42 Under the
regulations a clear distinction is drawn between factual data and
estimates based upon the contractor's judgment,4 3 and only data
which are factual and verifiable constitute cost or pricing data within
the defective data clause.44
Although the ASPR definition makes a distinction between fact
and judgment, in application the distinction is not always easily
made, for pricing data "may encompass information far beyond
historical information and may include many other future factors
having a bearing on the cost."4 5 In FMC Corp.,46 a case involving
price reduction arising under contracts for M- 113 personnel carriers,
the ASBCA was forced to consider whether the continuation of an
experiment to increase the production of track shoes for the carriers
constituted cost or pricing data. The Board held that under the
circumstances, continued experimentation did not constitute pricing
or cost data within the meaning of the Price Reduction clause be-
cause the experiments had been unsuccessful, and there were no
data reasonably available at the time of negotiation to indicate
probable success in the immediate future. 7 However, the Board did
not foreclose the possibility that experimentation might be cost or
pricing data "if data were reasonably available for the negotiation
process which indicated probable short-range, rather than possible
or probable long range, success of experimentation. 48
42 Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Lockheed Ga. Co. Div., ASBCA No. 10453, 67-1 BCA
f 6356, at 29,450 (1967); FMC Corp., ASBCA Nos. 10095 & 11113, 66-1 BCA 5483,
at 25,700 (1966).
43 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-3(e) (1965). "'Cost or pricing data' as used in This Part
refers to that portion of the contractor's submission which is factual. . . . Cost or
pricing data, being factual, is that type of information which can be verified. Because
the contractor's certificate pertains to 'cost or pricing data,' it does not make repre-
sentations as to the accuracy of the contractor's judgment as to the estimated portion
of future costs or projections. It does, however, apply to the data upon which the
contractor's judgment is based. This distinction between fact and judgment should be
clearly understood."
44 Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Lockheed Ga. Co. Div., ASBCA No. 10453, 67-1 BCA
ff 6356, at 29,450 (1967).
45 Id. The ASPR provision describes cost or pricing data as including more than
historical accounting data; "[I]t also includes, where applicable, such factors as vendor
quotations, nonrecurring costs, changes in production or procurement volume, unit cost
trends such as those associated with labor efficiency, and make-or-buy decisions or any
other management decisions which could reasonably be expected to have a significant
bearing on costs under the proposed contract. In short, cost or pricing data consists of
all facts which can reasonably be expected to contribute to sound estimates of future
costs as well as to the validity of costs already incurred." 32 C.F.R. § 3.807-3(e)
(1967) (emphasis added).
46 FMC Corp., ASBCA Nos. 10095 & 11113, 66-1 BCA 5483 (1966).
47 Id. at 25,703-04.
48 Id. at 25,704. The Board also stated that continuation of unsuccessful experi-
ments that might result in changes in production should not be included in the
negotiation of a firm fixed-price contract.
1968]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Lockheed Georgia Co. Division,4" in-
volved a contract for the production of a malfunction detection and
recording system for use in B-52 aircraft. Although the case primar-
ily involved materials cost items as the basis for the claimed reduc-
tion, one primary item involved the labor rate of a subcontractor.
The contractor estimated a projected labor rate of $2.12 an hour,
while the General Accounting Office claimed that there was reason-
ably available evidence supporting a $2.01 an hour rate. The ASBCA
found that the $2.12 rate was not cost data within the ASPR defini-
tion, since it was not factual in nature.5 ° In reviewing the historical
data upon which the estimate was based, the Board found that the
evidence presented by the Government was "too minimal" to
justify a reduction under the defective data clause. 1
From FMC and Lockheed it appears that since the fact-judg-
ment distinction is difficult to apply, the Board scrutinizes items
involving projected costs. If it finds that they are in the nature of
a judgment, these items will not serve as a basis for a price re-
duction under the Price Reduction clause, unless there is strong
evidence indicating that the data upon which the judgment is based
were defective within the meaning of the clause.
Implicit in the general pre-statute requirements entitling the
Government to a price reduction was the requirement that the
Government must have made a demand or request for the cost or
pricing data. 2 What constituted a sufficient demand for the pur-
poses of a reduction under the Price Reduction clause was settled by
the ASBCA in American Bosh Arma Corp.5 3 In that case the Air
Force contracted for the production of electronic guidance sets
for the Titan Missile. The Government made a number of changes
in the quantity of sets to be delivered, and was making other con-
tract modifications at the rate of approximately four per week. In
response to a request for proposals, the contractor submitted esti-
mates based on a fewer number of sets than were ultimately pro-
duced. Some months later the Government required the contractor
to execute a Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data. The Board
held that the original request for proposals and the subsequent
execution of the certificate were sufficient to satisfy the demand re-
quirement, even though the Government made no further specific
requests for current pricing data.
49 Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Lockheed Ga. Co. Div., ASBCA No. 10453, 67-1
BCA ff 6356 (1967).
50 Id. at 29,450.
51 Id.
52 See, e.g., American Bosch Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 RCA ff 5280,
at 24,851 (1965).
53 Id.
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We have no hesitancy in holding that the Price Reduction clause applies
to overstatements resulting from a contractor's failure to disclose cur-
rent data showing previously furnished costs to be too high, without any
demand having been made for such current data other than such as
implicit in the requirement that the contractor excute the certificate
of current pricing data. 54
The problem of demand appears to have been more academic
than real, for all contractors had to submit proposals and were
required to execute Certificates of Current Cost or Pricing Data.55
Pricing data demanded by the Government and not disclosed
by the contractor had to be "reasonably available" to the contractor
to entitle the Government to an equitable price reduction under the
defective data clause.56 The "reasonably available" requirement was
defined largely in terms of a "cut-off date" beyond which cost in-
formation was not reasonably available to the contractor for the
purposes of price negotiations.57 In determining this date, the
ASBCA considered the contractor's system of receiving, recording
and disseminating cost information from subcontractors; Govern-
ment records of negotiations indicating the date beyond which the
Government thought the data were not reasonably available; and
the amount of time normally required to prepare a cost estimate for
a particular item.5 In short, the cut-off date was determined only
after a thorough review of the price negotiations, the surrounding
circumstances, and a study of the particular contractor's method
of recording data received from other sources.
To justify reductions under the pre-statute Price Reduction
clause, the Government had to show that the non-disclosed data were
"significant" as well as reasonably available to the contractor. Ac-
cording to the ASBCA, pricing data were significant if "it would have
any significant effect for its intended purpose, which was an aid
in negotiating a fair and reasonable price;"59 i.e., data were signifi-
54 Id. at 24,851. It should be noted, however, that recovery under the pre-P.L.
87-653 Price Reduction clause is not dependent upon the existence of "a valid and
meaningful Certificate of Current Pricing Data." Rather, the two clauses are inde-
pendent of each other. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Lockheed Ga. Co. Div., ASBCA No.
10453, 67-1 BCA f 6356, at 29,446 (1967).
55 But cf. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Lockheed Ga. Co. Div., ASBCA No. 10453,
67-1 BCA 11 6356, at 29,446 (1967) suggesting that mere knowledge that the Price
Reduction clause will be included in the contract is sufficient to satisfy "demand."
56 See cases cited note 38 supra.
57 See, e.g., FMC Corp., ASBCA Nos. 10095 & 11113, 66-1 BCA 1f 5483, at 25,700
(1966); American Bosch Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA 11 5280, at 24,851
(1965).
58 See American Bosch Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA 5280, at
24,851 (1965). The ASBCA found that there was a time lag of approximately two
weeks to a month between the receipt of a price quotation and recording.
59 Id. at 24,852.
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cant if they would have a "practicable" effect on the negotiation of
a reasonable price.6° The significance of the data was expressed in
terms of a dollar figure representing the reduction in total estimated
costs below what was otherwise indicated but was not determined as
a percentage of the total price."' Although there were no established
limits as to the lowest amount that might be considered significant,
the Board has held that $500 was a significant sum.6'
In deciding whether the Government was entitled to a price
reduction under the Price Reduction clause, the ASBCA had to give
content to the word "disclose" and determine the extent to which the
contractor failed to disclose reasonably available and significant
pricing data.0" It has been held that where the contractor made
available all pricing data and records, and where the Government
examines them during an audit, 4 there has been disclosure as of the
date of the audit within the meaning of the Price Reduction clause.6"
Any errors not discovered by the examination may not be attributed
to the contractor's failure to disclose information.66
Under the old Price Reduction clause, the Government had to
establish a causal relationship between the failure to disclose (or
improper disclosure of) pricing data and a resulting overstatement
in contract price. 7 This requirement could have caused considerable
difficulty when applied to a specific cost element in a contract for
which a total contract price was negotiated and there was no agree-
ment or understanding with respect to the specific cost elements. 68
Although the contractor may have overstated one cost element, the
60 FMC Corp., ASBCA Nos. 10095 & 11113, 66-1 BCA 5483, at 25,705 (1966).
"In other words, significance of data . . . is equivalent to its capabality of being used
for its intended purpose."
61 American Bosch Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA ff 5280, at 24,852
(1965).
62 Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Lockheed Ga. Co. Div., ASBCA No. 10453, 67-1 BCA
1 6356, at 29,446 (1967).
63 See, e.g., American Bosch Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA 11 5280,
at 24,851 (1965).
64 Pre-negotiation and pre-contract price audits are frequently conducted by the
Branch of the Service for whose benefit the contract is negotiated.
65 American Bosch Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA ff 5280, at 24,851
(1965).
6, See Defense Electronics, Inc., ASBCA No. 11127, 66-1 BCA 5604, at 26,202
(1966). "The only explanation of the erroneous breakdown in the audit report that is
supported by any evidence in the record is that the auditor, through lack of under-
standing of the technical aspects of the change order and failure to ask questions and
seek verifications of his own independent conclusions, made mistakes in his own con-
struction of a breakdown. .. ."
67 See cases cited note 38 supra.
05 American Bosch Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA IT 5280, at 24,852-
53 (1965).
The Board observed that the lack of "agreement as to specific cost elements
[appeared) to be typical of contracts containing the Price Reduction clause."
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Government might have underestimated some other element in its
cost breakdown, and therefore there might not be a resulting in-
crease in the total contract price.
To avoid the difficulty in determining whether nondisclosure
caused an increase in contract price, the Board imposed what ap-
peared to be a rebuttable presumption to the effect that absent evi-
dence to the contrary, nondisclosure results in a corresponding in-
crease in contract price.69 The ASBCA believed that since the lack
of agreement as to specific cost elements was a common occurrence,
and both parties were aware that there was no agreement when they
included the Price Reduction clause, the presumption of an increase
in contract price was justified.7"
We do not think that the absence of any understanding or agreement
on amont of materials costs operates to defeat the effectiveness of the
Price Reduction clause when both parties knew such to be the situation
when they included the Price Reduction clause in the contract.71
In FMC Corp., 2 the Board made it clear that the method of
negotiation was immaterial for the purposes of determining the
effect of the nondisclosure on contract price within the meaning of
the Price Reduction clause. All that need be shown was that "the
Government relied upon data furnished to it, or negotiated a price
in the absence of data which should have been furnished to it within
the context of the applicable clause."7 3
Implicit in the requirement that nondisclosure (or improper
disclosure) of pricing data result in an increase in contract price,
was the requirement that the Government relied on the data supplied
or would have relied on it.74 If the Government independently con-
structed its own estimate and did not utilize data submitted by the
contractor, there would seem to be no basis for finding that the
contractor's improper disclosure or failure to disclose caused a
price increase. However, there is some indication that the Board
invoked a rebuttable presumption to the effect that the Government
would have relied on the undisclosed information (and did in fact
09 Id. at 24,853. "In the absence of any more specific evidence tending to show
what effect the nondisclosure of the pricing data had on the negotiated target cost, we
are of the opinion that we should adopt the natural and probable consequence of the
nondisclosure as representing its effect."
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 ASBCA Nos. 10095 & 11113, 66-1 BCA T 5483 (1966).
73 Id. at 25,699. However, the ASBCA pointed out that the method of negotia-
tions might be significant "in determining whether the Government did in fact rely
upon the data furnished or would have relied upon absent data in reaching agreement
on price."
74 Id. See also American Bosch Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA ff 5280,
at 14,853 (1965).
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rely on data that were improperly disclosed)." In Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., Lockheed Georgia Division,76 the contractor argued that the
Government negotiators had not relied upon a price negotiated be-
tween the contractor and a subcontractor, and therefore the Gov-
ernment was not entitled to a reduction under the Price Reduction
clause. The Board rejected the argument and held that there could
be no reliance on information not disclosed.77
The inevitable response to the "reliance" theory is that a party can-
not be charged with something of which it had no knowledge. It is er-
roneous to argue that because reduction agreements were arrived at in
three areas, this precludes a party from its rights under the defective
pricing data clause without regard to what data was disclosed.
78
From the language of Lockheed it would seem that the reliance
requirement applied only to data disclosed and that the presump-
tion of reliance with respect to information not disclosed was con-
clusive.
Equitable Setoff
Under the pre-statute Price Reduction clause it was possible
for a contractor to set off underestimates in the contract price against
overestimates in determining the amount of the equitable reduc-
tion.79 Before setoff was permitted, the contractor had to demon-
strate that the items to be offset were related to cost items "concern-
ing which the pricing data were defective."8 " The Board has stated
that:
To permit unrelated offsets would be tantamount to repricing the entire
contract, which is not within the contemplation of the clause.
8
'
In addition, setoff under the equitable reduction provision of the
Price Reduction clause seemed to apply only to costs for materials.
Consequently, the ASBCA has held that a royalty expense resulting
from a patent infringement judgment against a contractor and
which was not included in the cost estimate, was not an appropriate
cost item for setoff against over-statements of materials costs.
8 2
75 See Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Lockheed Ga. Co. Div., ASBCA No. 10453, 67-1
BCA 6356, at 29,447-48 (1967).
76 ASBCA No. 10453, 67-1 BCA 1 6356 (1967).
77 Id. at 29,448.
78 Id.
79 See, e.g., Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Lockheed Ga. Co. Div., ASBCA No. 10453,
67-1 BCA 6356, at 29,450 (1967). The Board discussed the possibility of setoff but
did not grant it noting that the contractor had made a "vague effort to offset," and
that the items were "only remotely related" to the overstated items.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
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Equitable reduction within the meaning of the Price Reduction
clause placed the burden on the Government to prove that it was
entitled to a reduction. In determining whether there should be a
reduction and the amount of the reduction, the ASBCA considered
all the circumstances surrounding the contract negotiations, and
made numerous factual determinations concerning the nature,
availability, disclosure of the data, and whether the failure to dis-
close caused an increase in price. To mitigate any reduction, the
contractor was permitted to set off understatements of related ma-
terial cost items against overstatements.
PRICE REDUCTIONS UNDER THE DEFECTIVE PRICING STATUTE
Although the Defense Department believed that the procure-
ment regulations then in force provided an adequate and more
flexible solution to the defective pricing data problem,88 Congress
enacted P.L. 87-65384 to curtail "windfall profits" and to "restore
the rule of law to the military procurement process . ,,." The
Senate Committee report favoring the legislation stated that:
Although not all elements of cost are ascertainable at the time a con-
tract is entered into . . . , [i]f the costs . . . are not furnished accu-
rately and currently as is practible, the Government should have the
right to revise the price downward .... 86
The opposition to the bill pointed out that it was a "one-way
street... heads, the Government wins; tails the contractor loses;"87
and noted that:
This new provision is directed against human error. It has the effect of
requiring that a contractor's foresight must be as precisely accurate as
an auditor's hindsight, a state of perfection not attainable this side of
transmigration to a higher state of existence. 88
While there was no opposition to controlling windfall profits, the
apparent lack of concern for windfall losses suffered by contractors
was questioned.89 Because there was such great concern among
some members of Congress that P.L. 87-653 apparently eliminated
83 S. REP. No. 1884, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2484 (1962).
84 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304, 2306, 2311. For the pertinent language concerning pricing
data see 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) supra note 17.
85 108 CONG. REc. 9967 (1962).
86 Id. at 9968 (emphasis added). Neither the legislative history nor the act itself
defines "practicable."
87 Id. (Remarks of Congressman H. A. Smith). The Congressman also pointed out
that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 already prescribed penalties for false representations made to the
Government.
88 Id.
89 Id.
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the possibility of equitable setoff,90 H.R. 7909 was introduced in
the 88th Congress." This bill specifically provided for equitable
setoffs and limited price adjustments to discrepancies known to the
contractor. 2 However, Congress failed to act on the bill, and there
have been no subsequent modifications of the Defective Pricing
Statute.
Prior to the first ASBCA decisions interpreting Public Law 87-
653, there was some question whether the Act would adequately
protect the interest of both the Government and defense contrac-
tors. 3 One commentator contended that the provision of the statute
that requires a contractor or subcontractor "to certify that to the
best of his knowledge and belief, the cost or pricing data he sub-
mitted was accurate, complete, and current . . 2 created a loop-
hole: defense contractors could avoid full disclosure of necessary
data and then, "as an excuse . . . rely on error, oversight, or the
general carelessness of [their] staff in investigating the reliability
of the price data."95 Another writer expressed the fear that the
statute would "exclude from consideration such equities as a con-
tractor's reduction in profit or loss due to his own incorrect cost or
pricing data."9"
The belief that P.L. 87-653 would work against the interest
of the Government has not been realized, but the fear that the
Act might work against the contractor has become a reality.
9 7
American Bosch Arma Corp.
Although the ASBCA did not have occasion to decide a price
reduction case under the Act until 1966,98 as early as 1965 the
Board compared the new regulations implementing the statute with
the older regulations.9 In American Bosch Arma Corp.,' the Board
reviewed the history of the Price Reduction clause and compared
90 See Cutler-Hammer, Inc. ASBCA No. 10900, 67-2 BCA 11 6432, at 29,826 n.3
(1967).
91 109 CoNG. REc. 13,930 (1963).
92 Id.
93 See McClelland, Negotiated Procurement and the Rule of Law: The Fiasco of
Public Law 87-653, 32 FORDHAM L. REv. 411 (1964); Petit, The Defective Pricing
Law and Implementing Regulations-A Year and a Half Later, 29 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 552 (1964).
94 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f).
95 McClelland supra note 93 at 442.
96 Petit, supra note 93 at 555.
97 See Cutler-Hammer, Inc., ASBCA No. 10900, 67-2 BCA ff 6432 (1967).
98 Defense Electronics, Inc., ASBCA No. 11127, 66-1 RCA 1 5604 (1966).
99 American Bosch Arma Corp., ASECA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA 1 5280, at 24,849
(1965).
100 ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA f1 5280 (1965).
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the new ASPR provisions with the earlier regulations in the contrac-
tor's contract. The Board observed that under the new law, the Price
Reduction clause explicitly refers to the Certificate of Current
Cost or Pricing Data and relates directly to the data certified.' 0 '
Under the pre-statute regulations the clause made no reference to
the Certificate, and the two were independent of each other. 2
Whether this distinction in form makes any significant difference in
application was not answered. Since the pre-statute Certificate had
the effect of a demand for all current cost data for the purpose of the
Price Reduction clause,'10 3 it would seem that the specific reference
in the clause after the statute merely makes explicit a relationship
that had been implicit. 0
4
The Board in Bosch Arma also construed the new Defective
Pricing Statute as imposing an "affirmative" duty on the contractor
to disclose data certified to be complete, current and accurate as
of a specific date.105 The old ASPR directed Government negotia-
tors to be in possession of current, accurate data and "to require
the contractor to furnish such data 'promptly' . . .,11
[T]he only contractual duty to furnish pricing data is such as can be
implied from the contractor's obligations under the Price Reduction
for Defective Data clause in conjunction with the Certificate of Cur-
rent Pricing Data.' 07
As applied, however, the pre-statute duty to disclose differed only
slightly from the "affirmative duty" under the Act. The Board held
in American Bosch Arma that an original request for data coupled
with the knowledge that a Certificate must be executed was sufficient
to impose on the contractor a duty to disclose even though there
was no further demand for pricing data.'018
The Board also observed that the new Certificate of Current
Cost or Pricing Data covers only factual cost and pricing data, and
101 Id. at 24,849.
102 Id. at 24,851; accord, Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Lockheed Ga. Co. Div.,
ASBCA No. 10453, 67-1 BCA [ 6356, at 29,446 (1967).
103 American Bosch Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA 5280, at 29,851
(1965).
104 But see Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Lockheed Ga. Co. Div., ASBCA No. 10453,
67-1 BCA 6356, at 29,446 (1967) (a case arising under the old ASPR). "Perhaps
there is a relationship between the two and perhaps they were so intended. However,
the action to be taken under either, or the obligations under either, are separate and
distinct."
105 American Bosch Arma Corp., ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA 5280, at 24,849
(1965).
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 24,851.
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eliminates estimates from the Certificate. Thus, the new Certificate
draws a clear distinction between "fact" and "judgment.' 0 9
Defense Electronics
In Defense Electronics, Inc.,'" the ASBCA construed the
Defective Pricing Statute in a case arising under the new Price
Reduction clause."' That case concerned a contract for telemetry
pre-detection systems for the Atlantic Missile Range. Even before
the contract was awarded, the Government ordered changes in some
of the tape recorders to be included in the systems. In its response,
the contractor also proposed to purchase recorders and other parts
from Ampex, a manufacturer not listed in the original proposal,
and whose price for the recorders was higher. Together, the modifi-
cation of the recorders and the proposal to purchase from Ampex
resulted in a substantial increase in the contract price. The Govern-
ment claimed that the contractor had furnished inaccurate, incom-
plete, or non-current pricing data with respect to negotiations be-
tween the contractor and Ampex (as well as other data relating to
the change order), and as a result, the contract price had been in-
creased by $400,296.112 Pursuant to the Price Reduction clause, the
Contracting Officer reduced the contract price in that amount, and
the contractor appealed. On appeal, the Board held that the Gov-
ernment was not entitled to a price reduction on the ground that it
failed to prove that the furnishing of inaccurate data resulted in a
price increase." 3
The Board made it clear that P.L. 87-653 did not shift to the
contractor the burden of proof under the Price Reduction clause,
and that the Government must satisfactorily establish every element
under the clause." 4 Generally, the basic elements entitling the
Government to a price reduction under the new statute are the
same as those under the older regulations: (1) that the contractor
furnished inaccurate, incomplete, or non-current data; (2) that the
defective data caused an increase in price; (3) that the Government
proved the amount of the increase."'
In its opinion, the Board indicated that "disclosure" under the
109 Id. at 24,449. As noted earlier, the ASBCA applied the judgment-fact distinc-
tion to cases arising prior to P.L. 87-653.
110 ASBCA No. 11127, 66-1 BCA ff 5604 (1966).
111 The original contract was placed by formal advertising and therefore was not
subject to P.L. 87-653, except as to changes and modifications in excess of $100,000.
112 Id. at 26,191. In its opinion, the Board pointed out that if the reduction were
sustained in full the contractor would realize a net loss of some $275,400.
113 Id. at 26,206.
114 Id. at 26,201-02.
115 Id.
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new law is identical to "disclosure" under the old ASPR. For pur-
poses of the Price Reduction clause, it is sufficient that the contrac-
tor make data available to a Government auditor and the auditor
examine the information. 16 In addition, the Government is bound
by the auditor's report, and liability for any errors in cost data not
discovered by the Government in its study may not be attributed
to the contractor. 17
Although the form of the current Price Reduction clause elim-
inates the requirement that the defective cost or pricing data be "rea-
sonably available" and "significant," language in Defense Electron-
ics suggests that in practice they are still necessary."' In discussing
the contractor's duty to disclose pricing data, the Board stated that:
The duty to disclose is satisfied when all FACTS (sic) reasonably avail-
able to the contractor which might reasonably be expected to affect the
negotiated price are accurately disclosed.119
The qualification that the facts must "reasonably be expected to
affect the negotiated price" is strikingly similar to the definition of
significant data found in American Bosch Arma Corp.2 ' and refined
in FMC Corp. 2' In American Bosch Arma, pricing data was sig-
nificant "if it would have any significant effect for its intended
purpose, which was an aid in negotiating a fair and reasonable
price."'12 2 In FMC, the Board stated that significant data "is equiva-
lent to its capability of being used for its intended purpose.' 123 The
Board in Defense Electronics went on to hold that the contractor's
failure to disclose two letters from Ampex relating to a reduced
price for the sale of the recorders did not justify a reduction under
the Price Reduction clause, because:
It is unlikely that this information would have had any effect on the
change order price negotiations, as the record of negotiations shows that
the Government negotiations team knew that appellant's reduced option
price was firm until 15 September.' 24
Thus, Defense Electronics indicates that under P.L. 87-653 and the
Price Reduction clause, data not disclosed must be reasonable and
significant, and that this requirement is implied from the concepts
of what constitutes cost data, and the duty to disclose.
116 Id. at 26,202.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 26,203-04.
119 Id. (emphasis added).
120 ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA ff 5280 (1965).
121 ASBCA Nos. 10095 & 11113, 66-1 BCA ff 5483 (1966).
122 ASBCA No. 10305, 65-2 BCA ff 5280, at 24,852 (1965).
.23 ASBCA. Nos. 10095 & 11113, 66-1 BCA 5483 (1966).
124 Defense Electronics, Inc., ASBCA No. 11127, 66-1 BCA 5604, at 26,204
(1966).
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Defense Electronics also emphasized that there is no relaxation
of the older requirement that nondisclosure of data (or improper
disclosure) must cause the increase in contract price.
It is incumbent on the Government to show that the change order price
adjustment was overstated BECAUSE of the contractor's failure to
disclose or its improper disclosure of data.
1 25
Cutler-Hammer
Approximately one year after Defense Electronics, the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals again had occasion to construe
the Defective Pricing Statute in the case of Cutler-Hammer, Inc. 26
The contract in that case involved the development and manufacture
of an airborne electronic reconnaissance system, a complex system
composed of 120 antennas and over 40,000 individual electronic
parts. Although the contractor considered that at least three months
were required to prepare a proposal, the Government insisted that
proposals be submitted in approximately five weeks. Due to the
short time permitted for the preparation and submission of pro-
posals, a number of computational errors were made in the contrac-
tor's final proposal.'27 The errors in computation resulted in an
overstatement in the contract price of over $500,000. However,
there were a number of understatements which, the contractor
claimed, understated the contract price in excess of $500,000. If the
understatements were set off against the overstatements, the net
reduction in price would have been approximately $18,000. Cutler-
Hammer claimed it was entitled to the setoff and argued that "the
'accuracy' and 'completeness' warranted in the Defective Pricing
Clause [Price Reduction clause] is over-all accuracy and not that
of each and every part thereof.' 12 In addition to the overstatements
due to errors in computation, the Government claimed an additional
reduction for Cutler-Hammer's failure to disclose a low bid received
from an unknown, untried subcontractor.
20
The Board held that under the Price Reduction for Defective
Data clause implementing P.L. 87-653, a contractor may not set
off understatements of materials costs against related overstatements
resulting from computational errors.130 In addition, the Board held
126 Id. at 26,202.
120 ASBCA No. 10900, BCA 67-2 9 6432 (1967).
127 Id. at 29,824.
128 Id. at 29,825.
129 Id. at 29,827. The subject of the bid was a particular type of antenna com-
posed of a number of other antennas.
180 Id.
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that the Government was entitled to a reduction for the contractor's
failure to disclose the subcontractor's proposal.'
In its opinion, the Board determined that the Defective Pricing
Statute "was intended solely as a vehicle for recoupment by the
Government of overpricing resulting from any of the causes
enumerated therein."' 82 A study of the legislative history of P.L.
87-653 failed to reveal a clear indication that Congress intended to
permit equitable setoff.' However, the Board conceded that "rea-
sonable men may certainly differ in this interpretation" and that
there was "some indication in the legislative history that the result
we here reach may not have been intended."' 34 Balancing evidence
that Congress intended to permit setoff against the legislative history
indicating a contrary intent, the Board concluded that there was as
much evidence, if not more, against setoff. Therefore, the Board
stated:
[W]e cannot say that the Congressional purpose in this regard is con-
clusively evident one way or the other. We are therefore constrained
to adopt a literal interpretation of the statute, and, if we err, it is for
others, be it Congress or the courts to set the matter right.' 3 5
By giving the statute a literal reading, the ASBCA abrogated the
equitable setoff concept applied under the old regulations.'86 Under
Cutler-Hammer, it would seem that a defense contractor may be
penalized for committing computational errors in a good faith at-
tempt to respond to Government induced pressure.
In the area of reductions for nondisclosure of data Cutler-
Hammer did not expressly alter the basic requirements enunciated
in Defense Electronics, Inc.117 According to the Board the Govern-
ment still has the burden of proving that the undisclosed data were
significant and establishing "the causal relationship between sig-
nificant, non-disclosed pricing data and the resulting contract price
reduction."' 38 However, the burden does not appear to be a particu-
131 Id. at 29,829. The Board also permitted the contractor to subtract $75,000
from the claimed reduction, upon reviewing the evidence.
132 Id. at 29,826.
'33 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 29,826-27. Cutler-Hammer has appealed the decision to the Court of
Claims.
In a footnote, the Board observed that H.R. 7909 had been introduced into Con-
gress after the passage of P.L. 87-653. This bill specifically provided for equitable
setoff. The Board noted that it was impossible to determine why the bill failed to
pass, but that "[Tjhere must necessarily have existed a body of opinion, that, as to
the offset question, a change, or at least a clarification . . . was in order."
1386 See, e.g., Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Lockheed Ga. Co. Div.? ASBCA No. 10453,
67-1 BCA ff 6356, at 24,450 (1967).
137 ASBCA No. 11127, 66-1 BCA 5604, at 26,201-02 (1966).
138 Cutler-Hammer, Inc., ASBCA No. 10900, 67-2 BCA ff 6432, at 29,829 (1967).
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larly difficult one: the Government apparently need only establish
the effect of nondisclosure with "reasonable probability."' 39 The
Board admitted that at the time of negotiations, the quotation from
the subcontractor "was far from being data upon which a firm price
reduction could have been reached . , "o In spite of this fact, it
seemed clear to the Board that "something contractually different
would have been developed to cover the situation as it then ex-
isted.""' The conclusion was inescapable that:
[T]he information was significant from the standpoint of over-all
contract negotiation. Of necessity, the very fact of its nondisclosure to
the Government leaves us to conjecture as to what precise effect a full
disclosure might have had on these negotiations. However, since it
was appellant's failure to disclose the information which created this
uncertainty the consequence, if any, must be borne by the appellant
and not by the Government. 14
2
Although the Government retains the burden of proving the
elements listed in Defense Electronics, Cutler-Hammer appears to
lighten that burden. Where certain data are available to the contrac-
tor but would not support a firm reduction and therefore are not dis-
closed, the Government may now be entitled to a reduction. The
causal relationship between nondisclosure and resulting price in-
crease may be satisfied by a mere showing of reasonable probability
that a disclosure would have resulted in excluding that cost item
and reserving it for future negotiation. 43
CONCLUSION
The Defective Pricing Statute makes significant changes in the
form of the Price Reduction clause required to be included in
enumerated negotiated procurement contracts. As construed by the
ASBCA in Defense Electronics and Cutler-Hammer, there seems to
be little difference from the old ASPR in the application of the
statute except in the area of equitable setoff. With minor differences,
the basic elements entitling the Government to a price reduction
under the Price Reduction clause are the same as they were under
the pre-statute regulations: that the contractor furnished inaccurate,
incomplete or noncurrent pricing data; and that the defective data
(or nondisclosure) caused an increase in the contract price. The
burden of proof remains on the Government, although Cutler-
Hammer appears to have somewhat eased that burden. Under the
139 Id.
140 Id. at 29,828.
141 Id. at 29,828-29.
142 Id. at 29,828.
143 Id. at 29,829.
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new statute and implementing regulations, the Board has indicated
that the pre-statute requirement of "significant and reasonably avail-
able data" will be implied.
A defense contractor may still question whether a particular
item constitutes cost data; to what extent there has been disclosure;
whether the data were significant; and whether the nondisclosure
caused an increase in price. At least a limited form of equitable
reduction is available under P.L. 87-653, even though the Price Re-
duction clause merely provides for a reduction. The cases indicate
that the ASBCA will continue to consider all circumstances in deter-
mining whether the Government is entitled to a reduction and the
amount of the reduction.
It is Cutler-Hammer's abrogation of equitable setoff that works
the greatest hardship on the contractor. If the contractor under-
stated items due to a failure to conduct a reasonable study within
the allotted time, then it would seem that setoff should be denied.
Where the Government pressures the contractor to respond to a
demand on unreasonably short notice, and the contractor makes a
good faith effort, to preclude him to set off understatements against
computational errors serves as a penalty. Although Congress in-
tended to protect the interests of the Government, it is doubtful
that Congress intended to penalize the contractor for errors that
do not result in substantial injury to the Government.
Alan E. Kushnick
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